An Application for Suicide. Why Ukraine needs NATO? Book Review: By A. Moldavanova

Zayavka na samoubiystvo. Zachem Ukraine NATO?/An Application for Suicide. Why Ukraine needs NATO?/Dmitriy Tabachnik, Petr Simonenko, Sergey Grinevetskiy, Georgiy Kryuchkov. - Dovira, Kyiv: Folio, ?Kharkiv, 2009. – 445 pages. (ISBN 978-966-5-0-249-2 and 978-966-03-4735-9. (In Russian).

The book is  a collection of analytical articles composed by five Ukrainian academics and politicians representing a range of political parties of the left and central orientation. The main subject is Ukraine’s relations with NATO and the broader outcomes of a potential NATO membership for Ukraine’s foreign policy identity and its relations with Russia. In addition to the main collection of in-depth articles composed by five main contributors, the book also contains the Russian translation of the North-Atlantic Treaty (Washington DC, April 1949), and several smaller commentaries by other Ukrainian scholars, journalists, and politicians. When reading the book it is important to consider the political context in which it was published, -  a year before the upcoming presidential election of 2010, and several years after the Orange Revolution and the election of Victor Yuschenko as the President of Ukraine in 2004. Hence, the tone of the discussions and analysis is often  too politicized and propagandist. Nevertheless, the book offers a good perspective regarding the political views of  a significant part of the Ukrainian political community and, perhaps, a significant part of the Ukrainian population. After the  2010 presidential and parliamentary elections that followed the publication of the book, most of the political forces whose opinions are presented  obtained  political representation and direct access to power. Not surprisingly, as of today, many of the foreign and domestic policy proposals discussed in the book have been implemented.

The title of the book “An Application for Suicide. Why Ukraine needs NATO?” speaks for itself. Hence, all the expert opinions portray a very negative opinion about NATO as an organization of international security and a very negative view regarding  Ukraine’s potential membership in the Alliance. All the authors seem to agree that not only would Ukraine  not benefit from such a step, but NATO membership would also jeopardize Ukraine’s political future, violate its territorial and political integrity, and fundamentally worsen relations with Russia. The latter seems to be the most important argument against  membership. Instead, the book recommends that Ukraine should seek for  a policy of non-alignment that would imply improving the relations with its most strategic partner (Russia) as well as keeping good relations with the West. This balanced position is considered the most appropriate foreign policy vector for Ukraine. Additionally, of particular concern for many of the book authors, is the involvement of the United States in Ukrainian domestic and foreign affairs, which in their opinion has had negative outcomes for Ukraine.

The first major contributor is Georgiy Krychkov – the member of the Communist Party of Ukraine. His analysis starts by criticizing Ukraine’s distancing itself from Russia and other Soviet Republics after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was an unwise political choice. Moreover, Ukraine’s foreign policy and its relations with Russia were proscribed by the U.S. House Committee Resolution 120 “In support of Ukraine’s independence” adopted in 1996. The resolution focused on Ukraine’s sovereignty and its distancing from the former Soviet satellites as well as distancing from  Soviet-style political institutions. In Mr. Kryuchkov’s opinion the very fact of such a resolution is the example of the outright interference of another state in the internal and external affairs of independent Ukraine. Hence, further actions of Ukraine’s government, such as the dismantling of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal, only weakened the country’s military capacity and did not produce any of the desired political outcomes. The development of the Ukraine own military has also suffered from the repeated economic crises and worsening social problems. Hence, current conditions of the Ukrainian military complex are unsatisfactory.

Mr. Kryuchkov argues that Ukraine has special significance for  Russia-U.S. relations, and President Yuschenko’s pro-NATO position on this issue appears to have been very harmful for Ukraine. Moreover, it does not reflect the opinion of the majority of the Ukrainian population that has held a generally negative perception of NATO. Alternatively, Mr. Kryuchkov argues, Ukraine should develop a more balanced foreign policy approach. The closest  foreign policy model was under  former Ukraine’s president, Leonid Kuchma. At the same time, president Yuschenko’s policies significantly worsened Ukraine-Russia relations, as evidenced by gas conflicts, the situation with the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and the worsening of Ukraine’s exports to Russia. Hence, current Ukrainian policies cause more problems than solutions.

According to Mr. Kryuchkov, NATO’s interest in Ukraine includes using Ukraine’s soldiers for the Alliance’s military operations; using Ukrainian military aviation; and taking  advantage of Ukraine’s territory and its geopolitical position. At the same time, Ukraine’s benefits are unclear. Since the Ukraine-NATO ten-year partnership  has not really resulted in substantial achievements in the military sphere, the question is whether we can expect anything to change in the long-run. Moreover, although the government has spent significant amounts of time and efforts for  pro-NATO propaganda,  public opinion remains negative. Finally, Mr. Kryuchkov argues that Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance will not strengthen its independence. If anything, it will worsen Ukraine’s relations with Russia, which will negatively impact Ukraine’s economy. Hence, instead of partnering with NATO, Ukraine should take a closer look at its internal affairs and concentrate on such issues as the deterioration of industry and scientific research;  energy dependence; environmental issues; utilization of  old military equipment; and too much foreign investment in the strategic sectors of Ukraine’s economy and  large-scale privatization.

The second contributor is Dmitriy Tabachnik, a historian and the current Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine. Dr. Tabachnik starts his essay by analyzing early relations between Ukraine and NATO established by Leonid Kuchma. Thus,  a balanced foreign policy and  partnership with NATO were justified at the early stages of Ukraine’s independence because Yeltsin’s Russia was a politically unstable partner. However, the situation changed when Russia got a new president, who managed to achieve political, economic and military supremacy in the region. As a result, Russia stopped being a threat to Ukraine. Therefore, in his last months of  office, Leonid Kuchma removed  Ukraine’s goal of NATO membership  from the country’s military doctrine. At the same time, NATO itself, mainly the United States, had started displaying  growing interest in Ukraine.

Dr. Tabachnik argues that from then on, both Ukrainian politicians and their Western partners have been covering Ukraine-NATO relations with numerous lies. This includes the massive campaign to discredit the image of Leonid Kuchma, the substitution of the goal of European integration with the goal of joining NATO, and spreading wrong information about NATO’s goals. The latter misinformation includes portraying NATO not as a military organization but as a humanitarian organization; portraying the Alliance as a club that each country needs to join if it wishes to join the European Union; falsifying NATO’s impact on military expenses and exaggerating military benefits; portraying NATO as an instrument for democracy and anti-corruption reforms; denying the fact that NATO will eventually locate its military bases in Ukraine (and thus denying NATO’s impact on Ukraine’s relations with Russia); denying Russia’s right to express its opinion; and saying that NATO would guarantee the destiny of Crimea, as a territory that would otherwise be captured by Russia. Dr. Tabachnik attempts to refute these stereotypes, by showing that if anything it is the United States, not Russia that tries to exert a destructive political influence on Ukraine by involving the country in political and military conflicts and worsening its relations with  its immediate neighbor. Like the previous author, Dr. Tabachnik says that NATO membership benefits for Ukraine would be minimal; however, negative outcomes would be significant. He further uses the example of France and its relations with the satellite countries on the eve of  World War II. While France supported the formation of the Small Entente, when it came to the real German threat, the country did not stand for its smaller European satellite countries. Thus, the destiny of small satellites (like Ukraine) is not necessarily determined by their alliance with the bigger partner (NATO). Additionally, Tabachnik uses the example of the expansion of Nazi Germany, and shows how this analogy could be applicable to the expansion of NATO – the dangerous process that might have negative long-term outcomes.

Finally, the author discusses the role of Sevastopol, as a strategic city that ensures control over the Black Sea Region and access to the Caucasus. Control over Sevastopol is important not only because of its naval capacities but also as a symbol of independence, freedom, and Ukraine-Russia unity – the symbolic role that Sevastopol gained over the course of its history. Particularly, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is the only capable naval agent that protects Ukraine’s security (Ukraine’s own fleet is weak). One potential threat comes from Romania, and in this regard the role of the Russia Fleet is crucial. Moreover, Sevastopol’s economy is so dependent on the Russian Fleet that it would completely collapse in case of its permanent withdrawal. Lastly, Dr. Tabachnik argues that Ukraine’s involvement in Georgia-Russia conflict in 2008, including both the political support of Georgian president and supplying the military equipment, significantly worsened Ukraine-Russia relations. Overall, Ukrainian foreign policy carried out by all its Presidents had been the policy of lost opportunities – a tendency that is both harmful and dangerous.

The third contributor is Petr Simonenko- the leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine. He starts his essay by discussing the events of Russia-Georgia War of 2008, as an event that should force Ukrainian society to think more carefully about the historical roots of the war and its modern causes. Learning a lesson from Georgia’s negative example is important for Ukraine. Simonenko’s analysis is based on the premise that the presence of too strong nationalist political forces in any country is likely to lead to negative and even dangerous outcomes. One such example was the triumph of the National Socialist Party in Germany. Another example is the case of the Soviet Union dissolution, where radical nationalist movements made sure to destroy the strong political, economic, and cultural ties existing between the Soviet Republics. Hence, Mr. Symonenko is not surprised that the United States and the transnational corporations are supportive of the nationalist right-wing movements in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

He further analyzes two major vectors of the American foreign policy (Pax Americana endorsed by Republicans and Pax Globalist endorsed by Democrats). He says that although these doctrines have slight differences, they nevertheless have the same goal – the construction of  a new world order. Symonenko uses the example of the color revolutions in Eurasia and their failings to illustrate the weakness of the American doctrine and the problem of  foreign influence on domestic political affairs. In fact, recent frozen conflicts in Kosovo, Tibet, Georgia are not single events; they are rather a system of well-planned actions aimed at supporting the economic and political dominance of the American system. Thus, like the previous author, Mr. Symonenko condemns Ukraine’s political and military support of the Georgian government during the war of 2008. In summary, he offers several suggestions from the Communist Party of Ukraine on what to do in order to improve Ukraine’s domestic situation and foreign positions. These include: changing the foreign policy approaches by reducing the power of one leader –the President – in making all important foreign policy decisions; to adapt the comprehensive law “On the Foundations of Foreign and Domestic Policy of Ukraine”; to once and for all ‘close’ the issue of NATO membership and to adapt  a non-alignment doctrine; to rely on Ukrainian military forces for  defense needs versus  a foreign military; to strengthen and develop Ukrainian military capacity; to advance the idea of “new socialism” by creating a global socialist organization; and finally, to publicly condemn the politics of nationalism.

The fourth contributor is Sergey Grinevetskiy, the representative of a centrist party Lytvyn’s Block. He also starts his essay by drawing  the reader’s attention to the Georgian conflict. The main argument of Mr. Grinevetskiy’s essay is about the value of the non-alignment philosophy as the best foreign policy doctrine for Ukraine. He first analyzes the history of the non-alignment doctrine as an institution of international law, discusses particular cases of non-alignment (such as Belgium, Austria, Moldova), and three types of non-alignment (permanent, war-related, and internationally sanctioned and only later domestically instituted non-alignment – like in the case of Turkmenistan). The author further discusses specific political conditions conducive to the permanent non-alignment of Ukraine. Of particular importance is Ukraine’s position in the Black Sea Region and the presence of  ‘frozen’ conflicts in that region. Mr. Grinevetskiy recognizes that Russia has crucial interests in the region, and therefore is interested in keeping her influence by all means possible, including military actions. Hence, Ukraine as a country is captured between Western and Russian interests in the region, and therefore, for its own best interests, Ukraine should adopt  a non-alignment doctrine. Mr. Grinevetskiy further analyzes public opinion polls that signify Ukraine’s public general disapproval of a particular alliance (either with NATO or with Russia), with 36.6 per cent of people directly supporting  non-alignment. Hence, there are objective preconditions for adopting this doctrine at the political level. Among other, Mr. Grinevetskiy mentions the negative impact of  Ukrainian politics on Ukraine-Russia relations, particularly evidenced by Ukraine’s military support of Georgia that directly violated the Ukraine-Russia partnership agreement signed in 1997.

The fifth contributor is Petr Tolochko – a former member of Tymoshenko Block and a current member of the independent civic organization “New Ukraine” since 2009. Dr. Tolochko’s essay is dedicated to the social and humanitarian issues pertinent to Ukraine’s relations with NATO. He starts by discussing a negative portrayal of Russia and Russian interests in Ukraine by the Ukrainian media, which sounds more like  anti-Russian propaganda rather than objective information. Then he moves to discuss the issue of the Russian language in Ukraine that is spoken by 8.5 million people, and yet is being forced out of the public schools, media and other social institutions. The other problem described by Dr. Tolochko is the situation with  history textbooks used in Ukrainian public schools. In his opinion, these new textbooks deliberately misinterpret several important historical events to form negative perceptions about Russia and its role in Ukrainian history. Finally, the division of powers between Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox churches supported by the President goes against the history, and thus does not make much sense. Dr. Tolochko argues that independence is good for Ukraine; however, he also supports stronger ties with Russia, as a brother country that shares with Ukraine common history, language, culture and other important social attributes. In fact, he argues, in some aspects the histories of Ukraine and Russia are inseparable, and it is not wise to push the boundaries. In fact, the push of Ukraine towards NATO is another problem caused by Yuschenko and the Orange government. It only worsened Ukraine’s relations with both Russia and West. He concludes by saying that national radicalism is the worst ideology for Ukraine, and Ukrainian leftist parties are the only political forces in Ukraine that would support a right policy towards NATO and protect the interests of all Eastern Slavs. Therefore, Dr. Tolochko is hoping that Ukrainian public support of the leftist parties would grow in the future.

Generally speaking, the book “An Application for Suicide. Why Ukraine needs NATO?” is a good read for scholars interested in the internal political dynamics in Ukraine, and the relationship between domestic forces and foreign policy outcomes. It does not offer insights regarding political theories; however, it does provide some good historic analysis and a pretty accurate portrayal of the leftist and some centrist Ukrainian ideologies. The major weakness of the book is its political bias due to the absence of representation of various political opinions outside of the left-central political spectrum. Although the arguments presented have merit, the analysis is very much one-sided. Therefore, although the book is meant to serve the educational purposes for the Ukrainian public, political elites and academics, the lack of critical analysis and unbalanced arguments make it more suitable for political propaganda. Part of what explains this is that the book was sponsored by the opposition parties (when the Orange Coalition was in  office); hence, the opposition’s opinion of the Ukrainian governmental relations with NATO was particularly negative. Since the return of opposition parties to the political mainstream, these parties have managed to alter Ukraine’s foreign policy objectives including the adoption of  a non-alignment status and a significant reduction of Ukraine’s relations with the NATO Alliance.

Aleksandrov, O.S. Ukraine-NATO: New Conditions and Realities of Collaboration, 2011. Analytical Report

Book Review-Alisa Moldavanova

 

This analytical report provides an overview of the recent changes in Ukrainian foreign policy and Ukraine-NATO relations. In particular, the report examines the main areas of military and technical collaboration between Ukraine and NATO, as they are affected by Ukraine’s recently adopted policy of non-alignment. In addition to the analytic report, the book includes abstracts from the round-table discussion “Ukraine-NATO: New Conditions and Realities of Collaboration” organized by the National Institute of Strategic Studies and the J. Marshall European Center of Security Studies, that was funded by the NATO Communications Office in Ukraine. According to the report, the recent changes in Ukraine-NATO collaboration have resulted from several factors, and these factors are analyzed through the following sections of the report: the non-alignment policy adopted by Ukraine; the adoption of the new Strategic Concept by NATO itself; the contemporary dynamic of Ukraine-NATO relations; the main directions of collaboration between Ukraine and NATO; current problems in Ukraine-NATO collaboration; and conclusions.

In terms of the non-alignment policy, it involves looking at two aspects – internal and external. The former considers the non-alignment policy as a stabilizing tool for Ukraine, considering its social divisions and heated political discussions regarding conflicting foreign policy objectives. The latter considers the non-alignment policy as an effective tool for finding a more balanced foreign policy model that accounts for the interests of the entire range of foreign countries – both NATO member-states and Russia. According to the report, non-alignment is a more strategic and forward-looking choice for Ukraine that offers a better balance between Eastern and Western foreign policy vectors. In particular, the report acknowledges the successful demarcation of the Ukraine-Russia border and solving the issue of the Russian Black Sea fleet as particularly successful steps in improving the security of Ukraine and the European region in general.

The new Strategic Concept developed by NATO establishes the Alliance as a dominant regional security structure in Europe, and it also identifies the main prospective threats, including international terrorism, cyber crime, trafficking, drugs and weapons trade, as well as the energy–related security. Along with this, NATO’s primary goals are not limited to defense; they rather focus on the search of non-military tools, such as improved diplomacy and intelligence, to improve regional security. In this respect, Ukraine’s interests fit well into all of these areas, however, Ukraine is particularly interested in the collaboration and development of its energy-related infrastructure (as a transit country that had a negative previous experience of being in the middle of an energy crisis in Eurasia). The other issue of Ukraine’s concern is the country’s indirect involvement in NATO’s operations that are not authorized by the Security Council. This issue needs further development since Ukraine is concerned about maintaining good relations with third countries involved in international security conflicts. The other important aspect of the new NATO collaborative security doctrine is Ukraine’s participation in creating a pan-European missile defense system (PRO).    

Regarding the contemporary dynamic of Ukraine-NATO relations, the report claims that NATO approves the current foreign policy choices of Ukraine, and in fact, some of the member-states are “thankful to the Ukrainian leadership for refusing the Euro-Atlantic intentions Ukraine that were “dividing” the organizational unity and were creating problems in the process of normalizing the relations with Russia” (p. 6). At the same time, NATO is interested in more specific policy collaborations with Ukraine, such as military collaboration. Hence, the report claims that NATO has officially recognized the non-alignment policy of Ukraine while leaving the security door open, depending on the development of the foreign political situation.  In support, some Ukrainian experts say that the non-alignment policy has, in fact, intensified Ukraine-NATO collaborations as evidenced by the adoption of the Presidential law from 2011 on the free movement of foreign policy forces on the territory of Ukraine with the purpose of joint military training; the adoption of the Presidential law in 2010 regarding the new system of the coordination of Ukraine-NATO collaborative projects; the adoption of the annual governmental program “Ukraine-NATO” by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine for 2011; and the 2011 Presidential law approving the implementation of the aforementioned annual governmental program.

The consultations regarding Ukraine-NATO collaborations encompass a wide range of issues, including Ukraine’s participation in NATO’s missions of various purposes (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya); the collaboration in reforming the defense sector as well as military and military-technical collaboration; and the collaboration in research and environmental projects. Of particular significance is the program for disposing excessive military equipment and leftover ballistic missiles equipment in Ukraine that is being implemented in two stages: the period of 2006-2010 that resulted in the prevention of potential ‘technogenic’ catastrophes, the creation of new employment opportunities as well as the introduction of new technologies; and the second stage that started in 2010 and will last for 3 years.

Regarding the current problems in Ukraine-NATO collaboration, the major issues include the implementation of the administrative reform in Ukraine that slows down the Ukraine-NATO collaboration, the lack of coordination among Ukrainian Ministries with regard to NATO issues, the developing of alternative security alliances by Ukraine (such as considering to join the Collective Security Treaty Organization - CSTO) at the expense of the relations with NATO. For instance, some Ukrainian politicians advocate for the enhanced collaboration with the CSTO, as a way to maintain the foreign policy neutrality position. Hence, they argue, Ukraine has developed numerous formal programs of collaboration with NATO, while similar programs are absent in Ukraine-CSTO relations, and should be developed to balance out the foreign security vector. However, the majority of Ukrainian politicians believe that there is no need to improve the balance of foreign policy vectors by developing additional collaborations with the former Soviet Union countries. Particularly, they criticize the ability of CSTO to ensure security in the region, and acknowledge the lack of its military capacities as compared to NATO.

Overall, the report concludes that there is a need to conduct intensive educational campaigns regarding the benefits and reasons of Ukraine-NATO collaboration, which would include conferences, round-table discussions, public speeches of Ukrainian governmental officials, politicians and experts. The major current and prospective directions in Ukraine-NATO collaboration should include military and technical collaboration as well as reforming the military and defense sector in Ukraine. Of particular importance is the participation of Ukraine in a three-way missile defense system “USA-NATO-Russia” that could utilize Ukrainian missile detection equipment. Finally, the major inhibitor of Ukraine-NATO relations is the pressure from other military and security unions such as the CTSO.

The second part of the report includes abstracts from the conference participants’ speeches, and I will provide the translation of the presentation topics to give a general sense of the topics covered:  

·         Introductory speeches by Andriy Yermolayev (National Institute of Strategic Studies), Pavlo Klimkin (Foreign Affairs Ministry of Ukraine), John Tefft (U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine), Marcin Koziel (NATO Communications Office in Ukraine).

·         Oleh Oleksandrov, “Current Aspects of Military and Technical Collaboration between Ukraine and NATO in Consideration of the Non-Alignment Doctrine and a New Strategic Concept by NATO.”

·         Leonid Holopatyuk, “Main Directions of Military Collaboration between Ukraine and NATO, Considering the Change in Foreign Policy Priorities by Ukraine.”

·         Kersti Kelder, “The Potential Military and Technical Collaboration between Ukraine and NATO.”

·         Vasyl Lytvynchuk, “The Project “Partnership for Peace” in Ukraine (disposing light and medium capacity military equipment): Potential Directions of Collaboration.”

·         Valentyn Badrak, “The Broadening of Defense Collaboration with NATO Member-States as a Factor in Ukrainian Defense Capacity and the Catalyst of the Defense Industry Development.”

·         Final summarizing comments by Oleksiy Melnyk, the military expert in the Ukrainian Center of Economic and Political Studies names after Oleksandr Razumkov.

Overall, the report is doing a good job in providing the analysis of the multiple vectors of Ukraine-NATO collaboration and providing some factual information regarding Ukraine’s participation in various military and military-technical projects. It also gives a good sense of the state of Ukrainian scholarship on Ukraine-NATO collaboration, and would be a useful reading for anyone interested in a general survey of Ukraine-NATO relations. At the same time, although this report presents a useful attempt to analyze the dynamics of Ukraine-NATO relations, it also presents a narrow point of view, which reflects the general confusion of Ukrainian political leaders regarding Ukraine’s foreign policy identity and prospective foreign policy priorities.

Book Review - Central Asia: At the End of the Transition.

Rumer, Boris, eds. Central Asia: At the End of the Transition. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005. xiii + 449 pp. $32.95. ISBN 0-7656-1575-4.

This book is the last volume of a five-volume series published by M.E. Sharpe, devoted to the study of the political and socioeconomic development of the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia. The present volume particularly sheds light on the region’s geopolitical situation that has emerged since the events of 11 September 2001, with analyses of the policies of Russia, the United States, and China with respect to Central Asia. It also seeks to illustrate the influence of the Islamic factor, the domestic political situation generated by the character of the Central Asian ruling regimes, as well as to evaluate the level and prospects for economic development and institutional reform in the Central Asian states.

The title of the book might raise some questions at first glance by indicating an end of the transition in Central Asia, based on the reader’s own interpretation for the word “end”. But Boris Rumer provides explicit explanation regarding this issue at the very beginning of the book: “the transition period has come to an end in the sense that the states of Central Asia have largely completed the process of systemic transformation,” and “the foundation of the social and political structure that was created and consolidated in the post-Soviet era will continue to exist for the foreseeable future.” Based on this understanding, the book offers a very timely and fresh insight into the evolving dynamics of the newly sovereign Central Asian states, which were hardly known to the outside world under the Soviet shadow, and received very little attention by scholars and the mass media before 11 September.

Not only is the book a ground-breaking contribution to the study of this area, but it also provides a comprehensive examination of issues currently confronting the region. A well-written overview by Rumer effectively presents a concise but clear picture of contemporary Central Asia. It segues nicely into the following three parts of the book, dedicated respectively to the external context, the internal social and political context, and the economic development of Central Asian states. Furthermore, since contributors to this volume are specialists from the academic communities of China, Russia, the United States, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, the reader has the opportunity to hear different voices and to gain refreshing perspectives to the issues discussed about Central Asia.

For the domestic analysis part, though the book has done a spectacular job in exploring the political and economic situation of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, there is little coverage of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. This might be due to the lack of credible or available data, especially in the case of Turkmenistan, where reliable information is difficult to uncover. On the other hand, however, this absence provides future researchers ample opportunity to dig into the once neglected or hardly accessible aspects of the post-Soviet Central Asian states.

Although originally published in 2005, this book retains its significance thanks to the high quality and broadness of the articles. Any junior researcher interested in studying contemporary Central Asia would find this book helpful.

Book Review-Energy Politics

Shaffer, Brenda. Energy Politics. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009. 187 pp. ISBN 978-0-8122-4200-3

This book seeks to illustrate the intrinsically intertwined relationship between energy and international politics, with emphases on the politics of oil and natural gas. The first six chapters of the book are organized by topical issues in the realm of energy politics, including energy and regime type, foreign policy, pipeline trends, conflict, security and climate change. The following six chapters are devoted to individual analyses on six of the world's largest producers and consumers of energy: Russia, Europe, the United States, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Thus Shaffer provides readers with both horizontal and vertical insights into the interconnection between energy and global politics.

Examining whether and how energy is used as a “weapon” in contemporary international politics, Shaffer explains the fundamentally different dynamics of natural gas and oil supplies. Understanding these energy sources is key to comprehending their political power. Of special note is the author’s attention devoted to natural gas – the fastest-growing fuel in terms of global consumption which has yet to be extensively discussed in academic research, and pipelines – a reemerging conduit of energy supply in the twenty-first century.

With regard to natural gas supply, the author identifies the degree of symmetry of dependence as the determinant of its stability, which is confirmed by her cogent case studies of Moscow’s gas supply relations with Europe. Furthermore, in light of the long-term relationship and long-term investment required by pipeline transport (used today in most international natural gas supplies and a small portion of oil trade), Shaffer reveals energy pipelines' vulnerability to security threats and its susceptivity to the political relations between linked states, thereby accentuates the significant role of transit states. However, Shaffer disperses the illusion of “peace pipelines” that energy pipelines can serve as a means for peace in conflict-ridden zones. Instead, she argues that cooperative political relations between states are more often a premise than a result of interstate energy infrastructures, with the exception of the pipelines in former Soviet states, which were built ahead of the Soviet breakup. Strong support to these arguments is offered by four well-analyzed case studies in Chapter 3 and 4, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project and Caspian Sea politics.

In addition, this book deserves credit for its examination on energy security issues. It offers an explicit notion of energy security -- a widely used but often vaguely defined term -- by dividing it into three components: reliability, affordability and environmental friendliness. Based on this definition, Shaffer specifies the tactics employed by states as well as international society to achieve energy security.

The book might have benefited from two things: a clearer presentation of the author’s own analysis regarding specific controversial issues other than a mere summary of existing diverse opinions; and a systematic theoretical framework to organize and support the main points. Nevertheless, Shaffer presents a comprehensive and timely picture of current energy politics, based on a wide range of sources. A future research agenda raised at the end of the book provides useful insights and implications for both researchers and policy-makers in the field of energy politics.